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Disgust
Introduction: art and emotional paradox
T h e  classic tragic em otions, according to Aristotle, a re  pity and terror; b u t 
pity and  te rro r share com pany with o ther em otional responses as well. W hen 
Sophocles describes the  terrib le  p light o f the ab an d o n ed  Philoctetes, he 
em phasizes how n o  one  can to lerate the pollu ting  stench  of his w ounded 
foo t an d  his unbearab le, agonized cries. »His foot was festering, oozing p u s / 
From  a foul w ound,« explains Odysseus. »Even at festivals/ We hardly dared  
touch  the  wine o r m eat.«1 Philoctetes’ fellow soldiers bem oan  his loneliness, 
b u t th e ir senses a re  so revolted by his suppura ting  flesh that they cast him  
o u t o f  th e ir com pany. H is festering w ound arouses the powerful aversive 
reac tion  o f disgust- b o th  in his com panions in the  story and  on the p art o f 
the  au d ien ce  o f the  play.
O f all the em otions th a t a rt can inspire, disgust is the m ost difficult to 
reconcile  with positive aesthetic  response, especially w hen tha t response is 
cast in  th e  s ta n d a rd  te rm in o lo g y  o f aesth e tic  p leasu re . O f the pain fu l 
em otions, fear is the  one th a t has chiefly occupied philosophy of art, and 
in d eed  it has always b een  acknow ledged as an indispensable com ponen t of 
certa in  types o f a rt such as tragedy. But disgust is a relative new com er as a 
subject for sustained theoretical analysis, having been traditionally considered 
uniquely  disqualified from  the lists of aesthetically enjoyable em otions. As 
K ant em phatically  states: »T here is only one kind o f ugliness that canno t be 
p resen ted  in conform ity  with natu re  w ithout obliterating all aesthetic liking 
an d  h en ce  artistic beauty: th a t ugliness which arouses disgust.«2
K ant was evidently w rong. In addition  to the case o f Philoctetes, there 
are  n u m ero u s o th e r  exam ples from  the history o f art w here the arousal of 
disgust is an  im p o rtan t co m p o n en t o f appreciative understanding . (Some 
o f  the  pain tings o f  T itian , Géricault, and  Goya com e to m ind.) M oreover, 
con tem porary  cu ltu re  seems positively obsessed with the presentation o f the 
d isgusting  -  in stories an d  novels, in the visual arts, and  in the powerful
1 Sophocles, Electra, Antigone, Philoctetes, trans. Kenneth McLeish (Cambridge University 
Press, 1979) p. 109.
2 Critique of Judgment, trans. W erner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987 [1790]) p. 180.
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com bination of narrative and  visual effects th a t fdm  an d  video avail. W ith 
the re finem en t o f com puterized  special effects, aud iences can now  savor a 
corpse decom posing before their very eyes o r  h u m an  bodies invaded by ro t 
or fungus, n o t to m en tion  all m an n e r o f repulsive alien  species. H igh  o r 
gallery cu ltu re  features the same titillating shocks, such as O d d  N e rd ru m ’s 
depictions o f evisceration, am putation , an d  ex c rem en t in  u n se ttlin g  classic 
pictorial style. Cindy Sherm an’s virtual tradem ark  has becom e the disgusting, 
notable in this unappetising  still life (Figure 1). I t w ould strain  cred ib ility  to 
claim all such examples as objects o f  artistic beauty, b u t their affective pow er 
an d  a sc en d en c e  in  a r t  testify to th e  » ae s th e tic  lik ing«  th ey  a ro u se , a 
p h en o m en o n  that dem ands explanation.
P erh ap s  it is the  sh e e r  n u m b e r  o f  w orks th a t  a ro u se  d isg u s t a n d  
com panion  em otions such as h o rro r, loath ing , an d  d read , th a t has h e lp ed
Figure 1: Cindy Sherman, 
»Untitled #172« (1987) 




to p rope l the recen t industry o f  studies on em otion in the arts and the familiar 
p h ilosoph ical paradoxes they present. Disgust jo ins the venerable paradox  
o f tragedy  a n d  th e  p a rad o x  o f h o rro r, variations on  the  general puzzle 
p re s e n te d  by th e  fac t th a t  seem in g ly  w e ll-b a lan ced  p e o p le  seek  o u t 
experiences in a r t th a t they w ould flee in reality: the painful, the terrifying, 
the  d istu rb ing , the perverse, and  the repulsive.3 To add  to the paradoxes of 
the  pa in fu l o r  aversion em otions, we have the  m ore general paradox  of 
fic tion , m ad e  acu te  w ith th e  now widely-accepted cognitivist theories o f 
em otion , that is, theories that m aintain beliefs to be constituents of emotions. 
If works o f a rt describe worlds we recognize as no t real (fictional), then  they 
do  n o t p re sen t us with facts in which to believe. How, then , do they succeed 
so effectively in arousing  em otions, absent relevant beliefs?4 1 shall d irect 
these fam iliar questions to the  em otion  o f disgust, adjusting the term s of 
d eba te  to fit this powerful aversion. W hat kind o f an em otion  is disgust? And 
w hat ab o u t aesthetic disgust, by which I do  n o t m ean disapproval b u t ra th e r 
an emotion appropriately aroused by art that is indicative o f aesthetic appreciation.
At this p o in t I should  stipulate the scope of disgust tha t will be my focus, 
for »disgust« and  k indred  term s are used in a variety of contexts. I may report 
my disgust a t the  slime th a t has accum ulated in a clogged dra inp ipe , and  I 
may claim  to be disgusted by the hypocritical behavior o f a colleague. W hile 
the  la tte r so rt o f  m ental o r m oral disgust can be an in teresting  constituen t 
o f  aesthe tic  response , it is probably only a m etaphorical extension of the 
k ind  o f  disgust th a t in terests m e here .5 1 refer to the kind o f em otion that 
typically  follow s e n c o u n te rs  w ith so u r m ilk, sewage, an d  slim e; slugs,
3 Disgust in a rt is rarely encoun tered  alone. Its close cousin is fear, which is why these 
two em otions are the m ajor candidates for the emotions of horror. (See Noël Carroll, 
The Philosophy of Horror [ New York: Routledge, 1990] ch. 4.) But fear is also the painful 
em otion tha t is classically understood  to underlie the powerful and transcendent 
aesthetic  response th a t would seem  to be the diam etric opposite o f disgust: the 
encoun ter with the sublime. These footnotes carry on suggestions regarding sublimity 
in com parison with disgust.
4 The d ifferent paradoxes o f em otional arousal by art are comprehensively analyzed by 
Jerro ld  Levinson, »Emotion in Response to Art: A Survey of the Terrain,« in Emotion 
and the Arts, ed. Mette H jort and Sue Laver (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
See also various o ther essays in this volume.
5 T hose who write on  the subject tend  to include all such categories am ong the 
phenom ena that disgust. William Ian Miller, for example, refers to moral revulsion as 
a reflective response that occupies a more complex place on a continuum  that begins 
with physical revulsion and nausea. Julia Kristeva’s concept o f the abject begins with 
nauseating food and ends with hypocrisy. I doubt that visceral disgust represents the 
bottom  p o in t on a continuum  ending  with moral repugnance. O f course, an author 




c e n tip e d e s , m aggots, a n d  lice; in fe c te d  so res, g a n g re n e d  f le sh , a n d  
decom posing corpses. These things p ro m p t visceral disgust, w hich is closely 
tied to unp leasan t involuntary responses, includ ing  th e  gag reflex, n ausea 
and  even vomiting. Even if we do n o t reach  the la tte r stages o f  reaction , the 
physical recoil o f disgust is palpable.1' This k ind  o f revulsion is the  h a rd es t 
to account for in terms o f attraction  -  indeed , it seem s to re p re sen t the very 
bed rock  o f aversion. Yet a t the sam e tim e th a t w hich disgusts som etim es 
exerts a peculiar allure, what Ju lia  Kristeva calls »a vortex  o f sum m ons an d  
repulsion.«7 Indeed  Plato used the fascination o f  disgust in  o n e  o f  his m ost 
pow erful p ictures o f the w arring factions o f th e  soul w hen  h e  d escrib ed  
Leontius, who adm onished his own eyes for desiring to look u p o n  the  corpses 
o f executed  criminals. T he upsetting  fascination o f the d isgusting has b een  
recognized for a long time, and its puzzling n a tu re  is d ee p en ed  w hen we 
consider w hat kind o f em otion  disgust is.
Theories of emotion
W hat one  surmises abou t disgust is in fluenced  by the d irec tio n  from  
which one  approaches em otions in general. In  the  course o f  this p ap e r I 
shall chiefly em ploy insights from  ph ilosoph ical theories o f  em o tio n  th a t 
dovetail with neurobiological and  psychological research . Ideally, science, 
p h ilo so p h y , a n d  a r t  th e o ry  s h o u ld  c o n v e rg e  to w ard s  an  e n r ic h e d  
understand ing  o f aesthetic disgust. However, we shall find  th a t answers th a t 
satisfy som e o f o u r questions genera te  problem s as we try to answer o thers, 
stirring us to fu rther perplexity ab o u t w hat appears a t first to b e  o n e  o f  the 
sim pler em otions. G eneral theories o f  em otions usually  re g a rd  th em  as 
co m p lex  m en ta l even ts invo lv ing  in te n t io n a l  o b je c ts , p ro p o s i t io n a l  
grounding, dispositional and  im m ediate causes, and  affective states th a t have 
physiological, in terp re tive , and  subjective c o m p o n en ts .8 T h e  cognitiv ist 
theories o f em otion now popular am ong  ph ilo sophers h o ld  th a t re levant
6 In English this can be characterized as the »yuck« response, which in teresting ly  
compares to startle, a reflex that is heavily exploited in theate r and film. W ith startle, 
the typical reaction is a physical ju m p  and a gasp, a quick intake of air. T he disgust 
response is also a physical recoil, often with a notable gesture of repulsion as the body 
folds inward and turns away. But the verbal response is the opposite o f startle: it is an 
expulsion of air, a »yyeech!« sound, expelling the presence of the disgusting object as 
though it were a bodily contam inant.
7 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror, trans. L eon S. Roudiez (New York: C olum bia 
University Press, 1982) p. 1.
8 The analyses covered in this paper concern occurren t em otions.
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beliefs  o r  (a w eaker v ers io n ) no n -asse rted  p ro p o sitio n a l th o u g h ts  are  
com ponents o f em otions.1' T he propositional content o f thoughts differentiate 
o n e  em o tio n  from  an o th er, fo r the raw »feelings« accom panying em otions 
are n o t d e te rm in a te  en o u g h  to distinguish their characters. Many em otions 
a re  in co m p le te  w ith o u t a g ro u n d in g  belief. G rief o r em barrassm ent, for 
exam ple, are in co h eren t in the absence of a belief that loss has been sustained 
o r d ig n ity  co m p ro m ised . M ost p h ilo so p h ers  o f  a r t  a d o p t a cognitiv ist 
perspective, an d  it is this p ic tu re  o f em otion that exacerbates the paradox 
o f fiction: For if em otions are d ep e n d en t up o n  beliefs, and  we do  n o t ho ld  
(existential) beliefs ab o u t entities we acknowledge to be fictional, how can 
we ac co u n t for the  em otions we feel in response to art? This question has 
p ro m p ted  a host o f  theories tha t a ttem pt to soften the belief requ irem en t 
fo r em otions o r to qualify the  em otions aroused by art such that they are 
n o t q u ite  the sam e as those aroused  by real situations.1” I shall n o t engage 
in these debates because I favor an analysis o f disgust th a t bypasses them  
altogether. I take my cue from  scientific and philosophical studies of disgust 
th a t analyze this em otion  as a reactive response that does n o t dep en d  upon 
th e  co m p lex  cognitive co m p o n en ts  th a t em otions such as pity, em b ar­
rassm ent, an d  guilt requ ire . As we shall see, this approach  to disgust solves 
som e problem s an d  exacerbates others.
A ccord ing  to neu ro log ist A ntonio Damasio em otions are triggered at 
two d is tin c t sites o f  th e  b ra in . O n e  site is the  p re fro n ta l reg ion  o f the  
n e o c o rte x , w hich  governs w hat D am asio calls »secondary« em o tio n s .11 
Secondary em otions are reflective and cognitively sophisticated. They include 
em pathy, m oral approval an d  disapproval, and  caring in general, w hether 
ab o u t o thers o r ab o u t events tha t affect o n e ’s own well-being. T he o ther site 
o f  em otional stim ulation  is in a p a rt o f the brain that is considered old from  
an  evolutionary standpo in t: the  reg ion  som etim es called the limbic system 
th a t contains the cingulate gyrus, the hypothalam us, and  the amygdala. It is 
h e re  th a t Dam asio locates »prim ary em otions,« including disgust. W hile the 
secondary  em otions req u ire  n o t only consciousness b u t self-consciousness,
<J Varieties of cognitivism are usefully reviewed in jo h n  Deigh, »Cognitivism in the theory 
of Emotions,« Ethics 104 (July, 1994).
10 For example, Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard University Press, 1990); 
Peter Lam arque, Fictional Points of View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) ; Susan 
Feagin, Reading with Feeling (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
11 A ntonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
Avon Books, 1994) Part I. Patients who suffer impairments of the prefrontal cortex 
are dysfunctional in practical terms, quite unable to make decisions and to hold 
positions of even minimal responsibility, although they continue to perform  well on 
tests designed to test reasoning and cognitive ability.
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the prim ary em otions a re  m ore reactive an d  ap p e a r to be  ra th e r  » h a rd ­
wired« in the brain. T h a t is to say, they substantially  involve the au to n o m ic  
nervous system an d  are hence less voluntary, being  h a rd e r  o r  im possible to 
control with conscious effort.12 Prim ary em otions ap p ear to be  pan-cultural, 
and  they are correlated  with standard  physical reactions, including  cringing, 
blinking, typical facial expressions, and  m easurab le  responses such as skin 
conductance of electrical charge. Disgust is am ong  the em otions apparen tly  
controlled in the limbic centers. It is also on the list o f what som e psychologists 
consider »basic« em otions, jo in in g  anger, fear, surprise , joy , an d  sadness.13 
They are considered  m ore or less au tom atic  an d  involuntary, th o u g h  ju s t  
how consciously m anipulable they m ay b e  is a m atte r for d eb a te .14 D am asio 
proposes th a t such em otions are innate  responses th a t are »pre-organized.« 
For exam ple, though one learns th a t certa in  foods are taboo  acco rd in g  to 
social or religious tenets, thereafter those foods provoke disgust as a visceral 
reaction because the  pre-organized response is easily tra in ed  an d  locked  
into place.
T he division o f em otions according to the physiology th a t grounds them  
is con tinued  in som e philosophical analyses. Paul G riffiths, in  his widely- 
acclaim ed book, What Emotions Really Are, is am ong  those w ho arg u e  th a t 
»em otion« is n o t a univocal label fo r the d ispara te  p h e n o m en a  to w hich it 
is applied. Disgust and  the o th e r lim bic-centered responses are am o n g  the 
em otions th a t he  prefers to label »affect p rogram s,«  w hich  are  ro u g h ly
12 This is a part of the brain that we have in com m on with o ther animals, and scientific 
studies of these emotions sometimes deliberately pay little heed to conscious experience. 
Biologist Joseph  LeDoux argues th a t fear is best exp la ined  w ithou t re fe ren ce  to 
consciousness a t all, for not all species that fear are conscious in any full sense o f the 
term. The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and  Schuster, 1996).
13 E xperim ents show differentiated  au tonom ic nervous system activity fo r six basic 
emotions: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust. See e.g. Paul Ekman, 
R obert W. Levenson, W allace V. F riesen , »A utonom ic N ervous System Activity 
Distinguishes Among Emotions,« Science 221 (Septem ber, 1983) 1208-1210; Levenson, 
Ekman, and Friesen, »Voluntary Facial Action Generates Emotion-Specific A utonom ic 
Nervous System Activity,« Psychophysiology 27:4 (1990) 363-384). T he num ber o f basic 
em otions varies by theorist. The term  may be used to m ean a set o f fundam ental 
responses out o f which more com plex em otions are built; em otions shared by non­
hum an animals; pan-cultural em otions displayed by all social groups. T here  are many 
who dispute the soundness of the idea of basic em otions at all. See The Nature of Emotion, 
ed. Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson (New York: O xford University Press, 1994) 
pp. 5-47.
14 The startle reflex, a feature of several em otions, is com pletely uncontrollable. Jenefer 
Robinson analyzes the startle response in an argum ent against the cognitivist trend  in 




equ ivalen t to D am asio’s prim ary em otions.15 Affect program s are patterns 
o f  a u to m a te d  a n d  c o o r d in a te d  re sp o n se  th a t  a re  » b iased  le a rn in g  
m echanism s« sensitive to objects with significance for the organism ’s well­
being. In  the  case o f disgust, we are evolutionarily p rogram m ed for quick 
response  to  things th a t are foul: dangerous o r noxious to contact or ingest. 
Such em otions are subject to a degree o f learning, b u t they set patterns o f 
rap id  response tha t becom e im m une to override from higher-level cognitive 
systems such as conscious beliefs. An im portan t feature of affect program s 
is tha t they do  n o t requ ire  assent to beliefs to make sense o f their occurrence. 
For exam ple, while g rie f is only plausible on the prem ise that one believes 
th a t o n e  has su ffe red  a loss, disgust is »m odular« an d  » inform ationally  
e n c a p s u la te d .«1Г> T h is  m e a n s  th a t  th e  re sp o n se  o cc u rs  q u ick ly  a n d  
autom atically  w ithout in p u t from  o th er cognitive systems.
T here  are features o f this approach to disgust that require modification. 
In  p a r tic u la r , G riffiths re fers  to affect p rogram s as » ...phylogenetically  
anc ien t, in form ationally  encapsulated , reflexlike responses which seem to 
be insensitive to culture .«17 But disgust, w hether aesthetic or natural, is clearly 
n o t insensitive to cu ltu re , no  m atter how visceral its character. Despite this 
shortcom ing, which I shall address in the next section, in many respects affect 
p rogram  analysis is particularly  ap t for an em otion such as disgust, including 
a e s th e t ic  d isg u s t. T h e  re a c tiv e , in v o lu n ta ry  c h a ra c te r  o f  d isg u s t is 
accom m odated, as well as its recalcitrance in the presence of contrary belief.18 
(For exam ple, o n e  may believe that a slug is quite benign  and  yet recoil at
15 Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (University of Chicago Press, 1997) ch. 4. 
Unlike Damasio, Griffiths does no t speculate that higher-level cognitive em otions are 
dependen t on affect proeram  emotions. The two systems may operate independently. 
(See pp. 103-106.)
10 Griffiths offers this p icture of the affect program  emotions: »These emotions consist 
of com plex, coordinated , and autom ated responses.... There is a flow of perceptual 
inform ation to the mechanism s controlling these responses which is separate from 
the flow of inform ation from  perception to the higher cognitive processes responsible 
for in ten tional action. This elem ent of modularity is required to account for the lack 
of fit between em otional responses and conscious evaluations of the significance of 
stimuli. In some cases h igher cognitive processes may be able to trigger emotional 
responses directly, but in o ther cases the associations which lead to the response must 
be separate from  the evaluations m ade by higher cognition.« Griffiths, op. cit. p. 93. 
Griffiths adopts the term s »modular« and »informationally encapsulated« from Jerry 
Fodor, The Modularity o f M ind  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983). The term  »affect 
program « comes from  Paul E km an’s research.
17 Griffiths, op. cit. p. 16. In fact, Griffiths allows for modification of affect programs.
18 William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997) asserts that in order to find something disgusting, we must believe it is in a category 
that w arrants disgust. W hile many instances of disgust require cognitive activity such
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its touch. O r -  slightly closer to a rt -  one m ay be em barrassingly  u n ab le  to 
pick u p  a taran tu la  tha t one knows is m ad e  o f ru b b e r .)19 A ffect p ro g ram  
analysis m akes it b o th  m o re  d ifficu lt a n d  ea s ie r  to  reso lve  p a ra d o x e s  
gen era ted  by arousal o f em otions by art. In  fact, we can  in tro d u c e  som e 
»limbic puzzles« into the paradox o f disgust. W hat h ap p en s w hen responses 
supposedly so prim itive and  hard-w ired com e to be fea tu res o f th e  highly  
acculturated  and theorized p roducts we call art? M any o f  the  lim bic-based 
em otions a re  aversion reactions probab ly  designed  th ro u g h  evo lu tion  to 
pro tect an organism  from  im m ediate threat. This is why they are m o d u lar — 
so that the organism  can respond quickly before slower cognitive deliberation  
can make its assessment. But how an d  why do  they becom e — in hum ans -  a 
focus for attraction? T he paradox o f aversion is h e ig h ten ed  by the analysis o f 
disgust as an  affect program . However, the paradox  o f  fiction is solved.
T h e  s tan d ard  fo rm ulation  o f the  p a rad o x  o f  fic tion  focuses o n  th e  
problem  o f belief. How can a read er feel g rie f on b eh a lf  o f  A nna K arenina, 
for exam ple, if h e  o r she does n o t believe th a t any real w om an has b een  
h arm ed ?20 W h e th e r o r n o t this is a sensib le  p ro b lem  fo r p ro p o s itio n a l 
em otions o r m erely an academ ic co n u n d ru m , with affect p rogram s we can 
invoke the fact that responses are encapsulated and  thus in d ep en d en t o f o ther 
cognitive systems, including beliefs.21 T h ere  is no  p arad o x  because th e re  is 
no  inconsistency o f b elief such th a t o n e  re sp o n d s w ith an  em o tio n  th a t 
requires a belief o r propositional a ttitu d e  th a t one  does n o t h o ld .22
M ore im portan tly , this analysis o f  d isgust perm its  us to answ er th e  
question o f w hether emotions aroused in response to art are genuine em otions 
o f th e ir  type. A lth o u g h  a r t arouses ex p e rien ce s  th a t ce rta in ly  fee l like 
em otions, if we do n o t ho ld  the beliefs th a t co n s titu te  th e  em o tio n s  we
as recognition, I think this may be accom plished through the train ing o f the affect 
program  and need no t require belief in the sense o f assent to a proposition.
111 Psychologist Paul Rozin has experim entally dem onstrated  the inability o f subjects to 
eat foods they like that have been m olded in the shape of feces. (See discussion in 
Miller, ibid.)
20 See Colin Radford, »How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 69, suppl. vol., (1975).
21 Note that psychologists who study emotive response often use pictures o r descriptions 
of emotion-arousing scenes to test their subjects, and they do not consider the scientific 
validity of their findings to be com prom ised by these »fictional« situations.
22 Nor do we have to resort to any of the alternative proposals for the cognitive con ten t 
of emotions, such as simulation theory or the so called though t theory, which holds 
the emotive response to art to be responses to non-asserted thoughts ra th e r  than 
beliefs. O f course, there is a sacrifice involved in accepting this solution to the paradox 
of fiction, since it jettisons the cognitive constituent o f em otions that provides the 
strongest grounds for establishing their rationality.
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ap p a re n tly  feel, p e rh a p s  we n eed  to m odify o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  this 
e lem e n t o f  aesthetic  response .23 Many conclude that although  the emotive 
responses a r t arouses m ay be powerful and  m eaningful, they are n o t the 
s am e  as e m o tio n s  a ro u s e d  in re a l life . B u t a e s th e t ic  d isg u s t is an  
unam biguously and  com pletely real case o f the em otion, and  its target object 
is the  w ork o f  art. It is this image o f food and  vomit th a t arouses aesthetic 
disgust (Figure 2), and  aesthetic disgust is real disgust th a t is occasioned as a 
p a r t o f the appreciative response to this work o f art.241 suspect that the same 
a rg u m en t could  be  m ade on  beha lf o f o th er em otions such as som e varieties 
o f fear, an d  it certainly can be m ade for surprise. O th er im portan t aesthetic 
em otions, includ ing  the  venerable pity, requ ire  a d ifferen t analysis.25
H ow ever, this is n o t to  say tha t the disgust aroused  by p ictures and
Figure 2: Cindy Sherman, » Untitled #175« (1987) 
Courtesy the artist and Metro Pictures
23 Philosophers have suggested various modifiers to append to artistic emotions: fictional 
em otions, quasi-em otions, sim ulated emotions, and so forth. These m odifiers are 
in tended  to account for the fact that our emotive responses to fiction are ju st that -  
to fiction; to an entity that presents a world we acknowledge no t to be real.
24 The im itation-reality distinction is further confounded by the work of Damien Hirst, 
famous for pickled animals, and G unther von Hagens, who reportedly preserves human 
bodies and exhibits them  as sculpture.
25 See Alex Neill, »Fiction and the Emotions,« in Neill and Ridley, Arguing About Art (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).Jerro ld  Levinson suggests that »Darwinian« emotions, that
51
Carolyn Korsmeyer
narratives occasions exactly the same experience as the disgust th a t w ould  be 
aroused if one cam e up o n  the scenes in reality th a t a re  p ic tu red  in  visual 
a rt o r described in fictions. T here  is a d ifference, an d  in  the  case o f  disgust 
that difference is best explained by re feren ce  to the  senses th a t a re  assailed 
by the disgusting object.26 Philosophy is so biased in favor o f the distal senses 
o f sight and  hearing  tha t the o th er sense experiences th a t trigger em otions 
are often  neglected . W orks o f visual a r t an d  narrative typically ap p ea l to 
the im agination via the so-called h ig h e r o r in tellectual senses o f vision an d  
hearing. W hile visual scenes may disgust, the  prim ary senses o f  d isgust are  
the »bodily« senses of touch and  smell an d  taste. T h e  sensory condu its  for 
disgust are lim ited in art, and  the m ore basic sensations th a t occasion disgust 
are absent (though  som etim es the visual display is sufficiently vivid th a t we 
can kinaesthetically smell o r feel the ob ject as w ell).27 If with o u r  technical 
resources we had developed n o t ju s t movies b u t the  »feelies« th a t A ldous 
Huxley describes in Brave New World, o u r aesthetic disgust m igh t be p u sh ed  
to such extrem es that Kant would be correct: this species o f reac tion  can n o t 
be converted  to a positive aesthetic response. (Leontius ru sh ed  over to look 
at the corpses, n o t to smell them .) B ut as things stand , th e  m ost pow erful 
avenues fo r the disgust affect p rog ram  are  bypassed, an d  the  em o tio n  is 
triggered by senses th a t can to lerate the  ex p erien ce  an d  even dwell u p o n  
it.28 This observation provides us with one h in t o f how aesthetic disgust m ight 
becom e an experience to enjoy -  o r a t least to savor. Som etim es we m igh t
is, those necessary for survival of the organism , are the ones th a t may be directly 
stimulated by art (The Pleasures of Aesthetics [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996] Ch. 
15.) While this is consistent with the position I adopt, I do no t th ink that the appeal to 
evolution can be sustained; if Damasio is correct, higher-level cognitive em otions are 
just as necessary to survival o f the species as limbic-based em otions.
2r> »What the idiom of disgust dem ands is reference to the senses. It is about what it feels 
like to touch, see, taste, smell, even on occasion hear, certain  things. Disgust canno t 
dispense with direct reference to the sensory processing o f its elicitors.« (Miller, p. 
36.)
27 Edm und Burke observed that prim ary sensations easily m erge in to  m etaphorical 
sensations, such that, for example, the taste o f sweetness transfers to a sweet shape or 
sound or expression. If this is correct, then the transfer o f disgust from  smell and taste 
-w h ere  it would likely occasion gagging o r retching -  to vision, renders the response 
less visceral than the primitive aversion reaction tha t occurs when the m ore d irect 
sense is stimulated. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful, ed.J.T. Boulton (University of N otre Dame Press, 1968 [1757]) Part 4, Sects. 
XX-XXI, pp. 151-152.
28 The question of the senses involved in the arousal of disgust is generally interesting for 
aesthetic theory, since it is the eyes and ears that are traditionally considered »aesthetic 
senses.« Most scientific researchers on disgust assume that taste is the basic sense for 
this aversion response, and subjects from  rats to hum ans display disgust reaction  to
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dwell on  the  disgusting simply because we can. A lthough it is an involuntary 
response , it takes place over a sufficient span o f time tha t we are perm itted  
to dwell u p o n  o u r own reactions -  unlike the sudden an d  m om entary startle 
reflex, w hich is a stock co m p o n en t o f h o rro r movies. At least w hen disgust 
is a roused  via the eyes and  n o t the nose, we have an opportun ity  to focus on 
a n d  even re lish  a lim bic resp o n se  for its own sake, taking a look  at the 
m achinery , as it were. I t is ra th e r like w atching your own h ea rtb ea t. I d o n ’t 
know if savoring an aversion counts as pleasure. Indeed, the issue of pleasure 
in  disgust has now grown even m ore puzzling.
So far we have answ ered two o f the standard  questions abou t emotive 
responses to art. Affect p rog ram  analysis has helped  us avoid the paradox 
o f  fiction, an d  we have dem onstra ted  that aesthetic disgust is a genuine case 
o f disgust. Now, as we tu rn  to the issue o f aesthetic attraction to this aversive 
response, we discover th a t in  form ulating these solutions, we have effectively 
cu t o ff one  o f the tim e-honored  ways to answer the paradox o f aversion. T he 
classic answ er to this question  was first supplied by Aristotle and  has many 
m o d ern  variations: we are by na tu re  imitative creatures who take pleasure 
in learn ing . T he m im etic form s o f art perm it us to learn abou t painful and 
im p o rtan t m atters w ithout suffering the consequences o f encountering them  
in reality . B ut I have ju s t  a rg u ed  th a t in the  case o f  d isgust th e re  is no 
distinction  betw een im itation  an d  reality, for the atypical sensory condu it 
fo r arousal only m akes d isgust to lerab le an d  con tem platab le ; it d o e sn ’t 
d im inish  its genu ineness n o r screen us from  its target object. So I canno t 
now revert to the  im itation-reality distinction to account for the enjoym ent 
o f aesthetic  disgust. H ow  m uch of a theoretical sacrifice have I made?
T he im itation-reality divide has shielded hum an n a tu re  from unworthy 
en jo y m en t o f  nasty  em o tio n s  by m eans o f  th e  assum ption  th a t ce rta in  
em otions are by definition painful and m ust therefore be enjoyable only when 
th e ir objects are fictional. However, such a distinction between venues of 
en joym ent does n o t survive scrutiny, as E dm und Burke observed long ago. 
H e specu la ted  th a t a th ea te r would quickly em pty o f its audience were they 
to learn  th a t a public execu tion  was being held nearby. All would readily 
ab an d o n  a rt and  hurry  to the scaffold to gaze at the condem ned  prisoner in 
his final agonies.28 B urke thus anticipates w hat is now a fairly w idespread
foods that once m ade them  sick. William Ian Miller makes an alternative case for touch 
and smell as the primary senses o f disgust. He also considers disgust a peculiarly human 
trait tha t develops between the ages of two and six. The questions of which sense is 
basic and  of w hether disgust is a hum an developm ent or a response we share with 
o th e r animals are im portant, though they exceed my attention here.
29 E dm und Burke, Part I, sect. XV, p. 47. See also John  Morreall, »Enjoying Negative 
Em otions in Ficiton,« Philosophy and Literature 9, 95-103.
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willingness to acknowledge th a t th e re  is a real in te re st in  w itnessing pain fu l 
em otions themselves, n o t ju s t their artistic ren d erin g . In d eed , if we can  do  
so safely, we even want to experience them  first-hand. However, if disgust is 
an  em o tio n  th a t is best u n d e rs to o d  as an  affec t p ro g ra m  d e s ig n e d  fo r 
p ro tec tio n , th en  it is doub ly  d ifficu lt to  a c c o u n t fo r  th e  ap p e a l o f  th e  
experience. Can the very reaction th a t n a tu re  seem s to have evolved to  be 
experienced  as acute aversion be a source o f p leasure?30 O r is its aesthetic  
power be tte r understood  in o th er terms?
Objects o f disgust: Aversion and Attraction
T h ere  are th ree  re la ted  questions th a t can  be  p o sed  re g a rd in g  the  
source and  nature o f the aesthetic power o f  disgust: ( 1 ) W hat objects trigger 
the experience? (2) W hat about the disgusting object is p ro fo u n d  o r valuable 
enough  to convert aversion to attraction? A nd (3) W hen aesthetic  disgust is 
aroused , does e ith e r the  ob ject o r th e  ex p e rien ce  itself b eco m e valued, 
savored, o r  pleasurable? O r is disgust a negative ex p e rien ce  w hich gains its 
value by being  a com ponen t o f a larger positive experience? T hese tu rn  o u t 
to be rem arkably difficult issues to settle, partly  because it is n o t c lear w hat 
kinds o f questions they are. At first they seem  to request an  em pirical answer, 
bu t as I shall argue, this is a fruitless task. E xp lo ring  these questions also 
reveals a shortcom ing of affect p rogram  analysis th a t requ ires re p a ir if we 
are to und erstan d  disgust.
Let us start with the question o f the trigger, the targe t ob ject o f  disgust. 
T here is a notable convergence am ong those who have w ritten ab o u t disgust 
when it com es to com piling a catalogue o f d isgusting  things. T h e  typical 
elicitors fo r disgust are objects th a t are foul. T hey stink  an d  nauseate; they 
are slithery, gooey, sticky, and oozing. In addition  to these sensory properties, 
disgusting things fester and  decay; they g en e ra te  low o r  m onstrous form s o f 
life; they pollu te and  contam inate. E xcrem ent, m aggots, slugs, verm in, an d
30 The issue of aesthetic pleasure blends with the question o f the com ponents o f em otions 
in general, for one can make a plausible case that all em otions contain an elem ent o f 
pleasure or pain. Spinoza, to cite a famous example, analyzed em otions as com pounds 
of desire, pleasure, and pain. See also Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reason (London: 
Routledge, 1988).
Spinoza introduces disgust in an interestingly am biguous context when he refers to 
the pain a man feels when he imagines an unfaithful lover: »...being com pelled to 
associate the image of the object of his love with the sexual parts of his rival, he feels 
disgust for her.« (Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley, [Indianapolis: Hackett] p. 125 [Part III, 
Prop. 35, Scholium ].)
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things th a t have n o t too  recently  d ied  -  all these figure on typical lists of 
d isgusting  item s co m p iled  by theorists o f vastly d iffe ren t stripes: an th ro ­
p o lo g is ts , p sy c h o lo g is ts , p h ilo s o p h e rs ;  em p ir ic is ts , p sy ch o an aly sts , 
existentialists.91 But, as David Pole observes, despite this agreem ent abou t 
its objects and  its sensory roots, »Disgust is no ultim ate datum  o f experience, 
like the  sw eet taste o f sugar...; it is a com plex p h en o m en o n  requiring  to be 
m ade in tellig ib le.«32
In  his re cen t book, The Anatomy of Disgust, William Ian Miller proffers 
several general features o f objects that arouse disgust: They are organic; they 
e n te r  consciousness chiefly th rough  the senses o f touch and  smell; and they 
have to do  with life -  its generation  and  its end. He sum m arizes the m ost 
basic an d  characteristic  ob ject o f disgust as »life soup«:
W hat disgusts, startlingly , is the capacity for life, and  n o t ju s t because 
life im plies its correlative d ea th  and decay: for it is decay th a t seems to 
e n g e n d e r  life . Im ag es o f  decay  im p e rcep tib ly  slide in to  im ages o f 
fe r ti l i ty  a n d  o u t a g a in . D ea th  th u s  h o rrif ie s  an d  d isgusts n o t  ju s t  
b ecau se  it sm ells revolting ly  bad, b u t because it is n o t an en d  to  the 
process o f  living b u t p a r t  o f  a cycle o f  eternal recu rrence. T he having 
lived an d  th e  living u n ite  to m ake up  the organic w orld o f  generative 
ro t -  rank , sm elling, an d  upse tting  to the  touch . T he gooey m ud, the 
scum m y p o n d  are life soup , fecundity  itself: slimy, slippery, wiggling, 
te e m in g  a n im a l life  g e n e r a t in g  s p o n ta n e o u s ly  f ro m  p u tre fy in g  
v eg e ta tio n .33
M iller’s descrip tion  is consistent with the idea o f disgust as an affect 
p ro g ram , because the  decay an d  stench of the disgusting is often a signal o f 
the  noxious, po isonous, and  dangerous, those objects we are well-advised 
to avoid before o u r slower cognitive efforts to investigate them  get us into 
trouble. At the  sam e tim e, the objects tha t arouse disgust obviously exceed 
th a t w hich is actually dangerous; they are charged with larger, culturally 
s c r ip te d  m e a n in g  th a t  a f fe c t p ro g ram s  a lo n e  w o u ld  be s tra in e d  to 
accom m odate. As M iller observes:
H e re  we have th e  m ost em b o d ied  an d  visceral o f em o tio n s, an d  yet
31 Many theorists who speculate about the disgusting invoke the support of anthropologist 
Mary Douglas, whose insights into the categories of the clean and the unclean are 
richly transferrable to food taboos, religious practices, myth, and art. Psychoanalyst 
Julia Kristeva uses Douglas to substantiate her theory of abjection; philosopher Noël 
Carroll, who rejects psychoanalytic explanations, invokes Douglas in his own 
Aristotelian account of the pleasures of horror. See Douglas, Purity and Danger, 
(London: Routledge, 1991 [1966].)
32 David Pole, »Disgust and Other Forms of Aversion,« in Aesthetics, Form, andEmotion, ed. 
George Roberts (London: Duckworth, 1983) p. 229.
33 Miller, op.cit. pp. 40-41.
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even w hen  it is o p e ra tin g  in  an d  a ro u n d  th e  body , its o rifice s  a n d  
e x c re ta , a w o rld  o f  m e a n in g  e x p lo d e s ,  c o lo r in g ,  v iv ify ing , a n d  
con tam inating  political, social, a n d  m oral m eanings. D isgust fo r all its 
visceralness tu rns ou t to be o n e  o f  o u r  m o re  aggressive cu ltu re-crea tin g  
passio n s.34
Life soup, in virtue of being  life soup, com es fre ig h ted  with m eanings 
that insert themselves in to  w hat are supposed  to be  m ore o r less involuntary 
responses to general qualities, such as th a t which is foul. B ut despite its reflex­
like character, disgust — especially aesthetic disgust — requires th a t we a tten d  
to its objects an d  their m any varieties with g rea t care  fo r n u an ce  a n d  the  
re la tio n  o f the em o tio n  aroused  to o th e r  ob jects a n d  em o tio n s. F o r as 
Spinoza observed, »The explication o f  the n a tu re  o f  every ... em otion  m ust 
necessarily include an  expression o f the n a tu re  o f the  ob ject by w hich we 
are affected.«35 Emotions, even affect program s, are partially and  im portantly  
constituted by their objects. D epending  up o n  the  degree  to which co n tex t is 
included in »object,« allowing the in ten tio n a l ob ject partially  to shape o r 
c o n s ti tu te  an  e m o tio n  p e rm its  a w ide la t i tu d e  fo r  v a r ia t io n  a m o n g  
experiences that ride u n d e r the sam e nam e. I en d o rse  this p luralism , for 
the appeal, attraction , pleasure, m ean ing , o r  value o f  d isgust a ro u sed  by 
a rt c an n o t be  addressed  the sam e way fo r all instances. Ju s t  as a carefu l 
approach to em otions advises that one assess them  case by case, so ajud icious 
study o f disgust advises us to look at particular cases o f tha t em otion. Aesthetic 
disgust can be a com ponen t o f tragedy, as we saw in the case o f Philoctetes; 
it can be a feature o f response to com edy, as the gross burlesques o f Rabelais 
dem onstrate . It is a presid ing response to  science fiction an d  h o rro r. A nd it 
can be fo reg ro u n d ed  (as in the work o f C indy S herm an) in such a way th a t 
the disgusting is an  object o f aesthetic a tten tion  in itself. In all o f  these artistic 
venues disgust is p art o f an appreciative reaction . But the ch a rac te r o f  the 
em otion  varies. In som e instances, disgust is en tirely  aversion — a d eep  and  
unam biguous pain; with others, disgust exerts an  appeal an d  a ttrac tion  tha t 
invites und erstan d in g  as a pleasure; an d  with o thers, th e re  is an  oscillation 
and  am biguity to the experience th a t is h a rd  to stabilize.
M uch debate over the pleasure in disgust has focused on science fiction 
and  h o rro r, partly because it is a com m on response b o th  to strange o r rival 
form s o f  life an d  to agen ts o f decay, fe a tu res  o f  th e  »life soup« M iller 
describes. Because this type o f narrative makes little p re tense o f rep resen ting  
th e  w orld  as it is, it also  affo rd s ob v io u s ex a m p le s  o f  how  d isg u s t is 
deliberately and  sometimes extravagantly em ployed to p rope l narrative with
34 Ibid. p. xii.
35 Ethics, op. cit. Part III, Prop. 56, p. 138. Spinoza is referring to passive emotions, which 
include disgust, though his comment obtains for all emotions.
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»culture-creating« zeal. Precisely because o f their roots in the generation  of 
life, d isg u stin g  objects a re  invested with m ean ing  th a t com plicates and  
increases th e ir fascination. Just one them e can illustrate how the natural and 
the  cu ltural are m anifest in the disgusting: reproduction  — examples o f which 
ab o u n d  in p o p u la r  fdm  an d  television. T he science fiction h o rro r movie 
Alien, now with th ree  sequels, features a female m onster whose sole purpose 
appears to b e  to  p ropagate , which it accom plishes by invading host bodies, 
includ ing  those o f h um ans.30 She is a relentless engine o f life, predation , 
an d  dea th , an d  she is brutally disgusting. O r consider the many reproducing  
m onstrosities fea tu red  in the popu lar television series The X-Files, including 
an  explosively phallic fungus which erupts from  the necks o f its hosts to spray 
invasive spores in to  anyone u n fo rtu n a te  enough  to be in the vicinity; o r a 
p re d a to ry  h u m a n  fluke w orm , pale an d  bu lbous like a huge, to o th ed  
m aggot, th a t invades the  livers of its hosts to p erpetuate  its kind. This latter 
c rea tu re  is supposed  to be a m utation  resulting from the Chernobyl disaster, 
p e rh a p s  a parasitic  version o f  the n o b le r Godzilla, also g en e ra ted  from  
n uclear fallout. Environm ental catastrophe, political disputes, sexual politics, 
history — all a re  m anifest in  the  spectacle o f the disgusting. Doubtless the 
p ossib ilities recen tly  o p e n e d  up  for techno log ica l in te rv en tio n s in the 
reproductive process drive the cu rren t obsession with reproducing  m onsters 
(includ ing  the m ost re cen t incarnation  o f Godzilla) and  with invasions of 
h um an  bodies to aid their generation. They are the contem porary equivalent 
o f  an c ien t myths o f  d em on  lovers who seduce and corrup t, and in the realm  
o f  the  d isgusting they are shadow ed by all the m uck and  slime tha t oozes 
p rim o rd ia l life. T h e  visceral, aversive charac te r of disgust is deployed in 
fic tional objects w hich, in add ition  to their en te rta in m en t value, achieve 
p o te n t m ean in g  and  awful allure. But w hat exactly is their attraction?
O ne possible exp lanation  of the appeal of the disgusting sees it as the 
p u rc h a se  p ric e  o f  th e  d iscovery  th a t  ev en tu a tes  fro m  the  u n p le a sa n t 
experience . This app ro ach  has its roots in A ristotle’s idea o f the pleasure of 
learn ing , an d  it is the one  th a t Noël C arroll advocates in his explanation o f 
the  p aradox  o f h o rro r. C arroll believes the painful h o rro r em otions of fear 
an d  disgust acq u a in t us with tha t which is m onstrous, alien, and  im pure. 
H o rro r, like tragedy, stim ulates curiosity, the satisfaction of which in the 
cou rse  o f a narra tive  is a p leasure. T h e  aversive quality o f disgust is no t 
transfo rm ed  to p leasure. R ather, it is the pain one m ust en d u re  for the sake
30 B arb a ra  C reed  argues th a t such m onsters re p re se n t the  »archaic m other,«  a 
parthenogen ic  reproductive m achine that is psychologically primitive to the pre- 
O edipal m other recognized by psychoanalytic theory. The Monstrous Feminine: Film, 
Feminism, Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1993).
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of discovery a t the far side o f the h o rr id  m o m en t.37 W hen  o n e  first views 
»Firewalker,« the episode o f The X-Files in  w hich the  parasitic  fungus bursts 
from  the neck of its host, the erup tion  is p reced ed  by scenes o f chok ing  and  
gagging in which the ripen ing  parasite visibly pulses in  the  swollen neck. It 
is tem pting  to close o n e ’s eyes, b u t o n e  is also intensely curious to find  o u t 
what is going on. Perhaps aesthetic disgust in this exam ple is a p a in  th a t is 
necessary to experience in o rd e r to ea rn  the  p leasu re  o f discovery a t the 
end  o f the story. O n the o ther hand, isn ’t there a desire to look, like Leontius, 
on  the parasite  itself, ind icating  its a ttraction? If so, is this a ttra c tio n  to 
som ething perversely pleasurable?
W hen I first began th ink ing  ab o u t aesthetic  disgust, the  p arad o x  o f 
pleasure seem ed to m e to be the m ost in teresting  puzzle to  solve. However, 
as I explore the subject further, the questions gen e ra ted  by this issue ap p ear 
to be badly form ulated. T here  are two alternatives typically posed: e ith e r 
disgust is an  experience in which aversion and  pleasure m ingle, o r it retains 
its painful character b u t gains aesthetic value in v irtue o f  its ro le  in  a larger 
experience. How in fact is such a d ispute to be understood? This sounds at 
first like an em pirical question, as th o u g h  if we w ere to exam ine o u r own 
reactions very attentively, we m ight d iscern  w he ther aversion an d  a ttraction  
occur in sequence o r sim ultaneously, separately  o r b len d ed . B ut can this 
be determ ined? Some writers on  h o rro r  classify th e ir  ex p e rien ce  o f  the  
d isgusting as partly p leasurable; o th ers  do n o t.38 T h ese  are (p resum ab ly  
honest) subjective reports, and there is no  vantage from  which to adjudicate 
the dispute. Introspection is no t a finely tuned  instrum ent, and  if the question 
o f p leasu re  is co n stru ed  em pirica lly  th e re  is n o  way to  se ttle  th e  issue. 
Alternatively, one may suspect tha t the  question  affords only a stipulative 
answer d ep e n d en t up o n  p rio r theoretical com m itm ents. If  this is the  case, 
then one who adheres to the idea that disgust is an  evolved aversive response 
m ight insist upon  its intrinsically negative quality, w hereas som eone who 
subscribes to F reud’s theory that disgust is a réaction-fo rm ation  obscuring  
sexual d es ire  w ould insist u p o n  its c o m b in ed  aversion  a n d  a ttra c tio n . 
(Perhaps the old oxymoron »negative pleasure« had  its roots in the  obscurity 
of this issue.)
We can elaborate the difficulty o f resolving the am biguities o f attraction
37 Carroll, op.cit., chap te r 4. C om pare K an t’s critique o f  Burke: fea r c a n n o t be a 
com ponent o f sublime pleasure, because once the fear is overcome it brings relief 
and the desire never to experience that again. Kant jettisons all fear from  the encounter 
with the sublime, whereas Burke retains it in the notion of sublime delight, which always 
teeters on the brink of terror and sustains both a positive and negative affective valence.
38 See the exchange am ong Carroll, Alex Neill, and  Susan Feagin in Philosophical Studies 
65 (1992) pp. 53-90.
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an d  aversion in objects o f  disgust by noticing how a sim ilar them e occurs in 
fairy tales -  the en c h an ted  frog who in am phib ian  form  m ust be em braced  
by the  m aiden  b efo re  resum ing  his royal coun tenance, or the loathsom e 
Laidly W orm who m ust be kissed by the re tu rn ing  adventurer Childe Wynde, 
whose touch  o f the revolting m onster (which is m ore o f a dragon than  a 
worm ) restores the form  o f his beloved sister. These exam ples tantalize with 
the  balance o f p leasure an d  pain they indicate -  for the worm is a hideous 
an d  fearsom e creatu re , b u t the enchan ted  girl trapped  within is an object 
o f  love. In these tales it is som ew hat easier to separate elem ents of attraction 
an d  aversion, for they are externalized  and  personified  as frog and  prince, 
w orm  an d  sister. However, frog and  prince are only extensionally identical. 
If  they were en tire ly  the sam e, one would get no cred it for kissing a frog 
an d  w ould n o t m erit the standard  reward of living happily  ever after. T he 
story trades on  the duality o f -  and possibly oscillation betw een -  love and  
aversion, d isgust an d  affection. M oreover, this com parison  points o u t a 
fu r th e r am biguity in the  p leasure question: If there is pleasure in aesthetic 
disgust, is it p leasure in the  object tha t arouses disgust, o r an en joym ent o f 
the feelingitse\P  Given tha t in ten tional objects are constituents o f em otions, 
this is an  even m ore difficult distinction to draw than that between frogs and 
princes. But it d irects o u r a tten tion  to the righ t place: to the various contexts 
and  objects that occasion and  constitute disgust. W hether there is one »mental 
event« here  (a com bination  o f pleasure and pain) or two (separate pleasures 
an d  pains co -ex isting), is im possib le to d e te rm in e  with ex ac titu d e  an d  
p ro b a b ly  d iffe rs  fro m  o c c u rre n c e  to o ccu rren ce . W hat is c lea r is th a t  
so m eth in g  ab o u t aesthetic disgust invites one to repeat the experience, n o t 
to flee from  it as a sim ple aversion. It may be grimly pleasurable, it may be 
awful b u t valuable for its m eaning and consequence. O r both . Much depends 
on the particu la r ob ject o f aesthetic disgust.
Som e art works w ithout narrative seem ra th e r com pellingly to requ ire  
th e  savorab ility  o f a e s th e tic  d isgust. (I leave o p en  w h e th e r  the  savor 
constitutes a p leasure.) Cindy S herm an’s photographs, all called »Untitled,« 
only h in t a t the  sketch iest o f  narrative contexts. Disgust here  can n o t be 
alleviated by the satisfaction o f curiosity.39 In fact, curiosity is aroused b u t 
thw arted, left in stasis, a p e rm an en t unsettled disturbance. T he pictures elicit 
a som ew hat inchoate  anxiety abou t the borders o f hum an and  non-hum an, 
and  ab o u t personal identity (heightened  by the fact that nearly every picture 
is o f Sherm an h erse lf). W hen art enters such territory, it prods at o n e ’s sense 
o f self an d  p rom pts acu te a tten tio n  to the em otions aroused  and what they 
m ig h t d isclose a b o u t oneself. S h e rm an ’s p ictu res, with th e ir  air o f  th e
30 A lthough Carroll suggests that his solution is appropriate for non-narrative arts as well.
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u n can n y , th e  fam ilia r, a n d  th e  s tra n g e , seem  to  tu g  a t  m em o ry  a n d  
recognition  as if to pull to the surface som eth ing  deeply  buried . T hey invite 
an inward-directed account of their pow er th a t p robes deep  in to  the  recesses 
o f the m ind, suggesting a psychology o f  disgust th a t invokes reg ions o f  the  
unconscious where d eep er elicitors o f this em otion  lie in wait.
Ju lia  Kristeva regards disgust as an  em otion  th a t recognizes the  th rea t 
o f slimy, oozy, life-generating and  death-dealing  decay, w hich is n o t only an  
offense to  th e  senses b u t  also a th re a t  to id en tity . T h in g s  th a t  d isg u st 
re p re s e n t  th e  o v e rta k in g  o f  fo rm  by fo rm le ssn e ss , o f  d is t in c tio n  by 
undifferen tiation . They call to m ind  the  tenuousness o f o u r  own identity , 
under siege from the first m om ents o f its form ation.411 T he attraction-aversion 
duality o f disgust in Kristeva’s analysis is underw ritten  by h e r  psychoanalytic 
framework and  her theory o f abjection: Each developing consciousness forms 
its own identity th rough  distinguishing itself from  o th e r things. T h e  m ost 
primitive stage of the process o f self-differentiation, in Kristeva’s view, requires 
separation from the fusion state o f pre-natal oneness with the in terna l m atrix  
o f the m o th e r’s body. T he m aternal body lurks b en ea th  consciousness as 
invitation to regain this state of oneness, an d  so ab jection attracts. But a t the 
same tim e this invitation is a horrific th rea t to the fo rm ed  self th a t w ould 
lose identity  were it to succum b to the lu re  o f  the abject.
T he centrality  o f the m aternal in  Kristeva’s theory  provides a way to 
u n d ers ta n d  the eerie  a tten tio n  to g e n d e r  an d  the  fem ale body  o f  these 
pho tographs (Figure 3), a p ro m in en t fea tu re  o f  S h e rm an ’s w ork th a t is also 
fo u n d  in  m any  o th e r  works o f  th e  g a lle ry  a n d  th e a te r .41 In d e e d , th e  
appropriateness of the concept of abjection for a good deal o f  con tem porary  
art invites the suspicion that em otions have cu ltu ra l form  an d  m om en t, an d  
that we m ight be playing out an obsession with this particular species o f disgust 
m o re  o r  less g lobally  in  a r t  a n d  e n te r ta in m e n t .  T h e  c o n f lu e n c e  o f  
preoccupations with femaleness and  the grotesque body affords an o th e r way
40 To draw what I hope is not too farfetched a com parison: In a way Kristeva’s theory 
partakes of similar virtues and problems as does the solution Kant posed to the pleasure 
of the sublime. Kant also directed our a ttention inward away from  the raging seas and 
starry heavens we thought we were enjoying; the p roper object o f sublimity is ou r own 
minds and our awareness of the supersensible dim ension of reason that gives rise to 
the autonom ous moral will. The unsym pathetic m ight find K ant’s sublim e a b it self- 
congratulatory.
41 See Laura Mulvey, »Cosmetics and Abjection: Cindy Sherm an 1977-87,« in Fetishism 
and. Curiosity (Indiana University Press, 1996). Barbara Creed, op. cit., makes interesting 
use of Kristeva in her film analysis. See also Claire Kahane, »Freud’s Sublimation: Disgust, 
Desire and the Female Body,« American Imago 49:4 (W inter, 1992) 411-426.
See also the Lacanian analysis of disgust o f Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object o f Ideology 
(London: Verso, 1989) esp. pp. 76-79; 132-136.
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to discern disgust as a culture-creating passion. A response that appears h ard ­
w ired  a n d  n a tu ra l em erg es  in  a r t  a t a p articu la r tim e in  h isto ry  w ith a 
prevalence a n d  in tensity  th a t far exceeds deliberate m an ipu la tion  o f the 
theory  em ployed on  its account.
However, all the independen t interest of disgust itself, the grisly titillation 
o f h o r r o r  a n d  sc ience  fic tio n , the  d ifficu lt ep ip h an ie s  th a t en su e , the  
in tellectual recrea tio n , an d  the  occasional sheer fun o f  disgust, should  n o t 
obscure the  fact tha t the function o f aesthetic disgust is often -  perhaps m ost 
o ften  -  frau g h t with grave m oral significance. Disgust alienates; it may both  
p ro m p t an d  block sympathy; it evokes scorn and  co n tem p t as well as pity, 
and  it certainly provokes fear, for the ills to which the flesh is prey are handed  
o u t a t random . This is a n o th e r  way th a t the disgusting object rep resen ts a 
threat, for it presents the discom fort that we ourselves may becom e disgusting,
Figure 3: Cindy Sherman, 
»Untitled #160« (1986) 




at least fo r tha t in terlude before one becom es n o th in g  a t all. B efitting its 
m o d u la r ch a rac te r, d isgust is very d iff icu lt to  in te r ru p t ,  a n d  it can  be  
dep loyed  in art -  an d  in life as well -  b o th  to  evoke com passion  a n d  to 
ostracize. Aesthetic disgust in contexts th a t are  tragic o r  otherw ise d ifficult 
is rarely am biguous in its affective valence, fo r appreciative u n d ers tan d in g  
requires arousal o f these em otions in their purely painful forms. Many scenes 
o f  Steven S p ie lberg’s movie Schindler’s List, fo r exam ple , evoke d ifficu lt 
em o tio n s, in c lu d in g  disgust, in the  co u rse  o f  a p p re c ia tin g  its co m p lex  
narrative. O ne unforgettab le sho t shows a ch ild  in  the  co n cen tra tio n  cam p 
at Plaszow h id ing  from  the military detail w hich is ro u n d in g  up  inm ates an d  
sh ipp ing  them  to Auschwitz. H e has desperately  so u g h t a h id in g  place by 
crawling down one o f the barracks toilets. W e see h im  awash in a p o n d  o f 
hum an  excrem ent, which has splashed across his nose an d  m outh . T h e  scene 
is d ifficult to en d u re , an d  the disgust evoked is o n e  o f  an  in d isp en sab le  
sequence o f aesthetic em otions aroused  by this film. T his disgust m atches 
its painful character as aversive response, and  because this is a child, an  u tte r  
innocent, disgust sum m ons a tten d an t em otions o f pity, an g e r on his behalf, 
an d  dreadfu l hope tha t he will n o t be discovered. B ut it m igh t have h ad  a 
d iffe ren t effect, for w hen one becom es d isgusting  to  o th ers , it can  take 
supererogatory  effort to overcom e the aversion and  m uster com passion. We 
may th ink  again o f Philoctetes, who alth o u g h  a h e ro  h ad  the  m isfo rtune to 
tread  on  fo rb idden  ground, suffered his u n h ea lab le  w ound, an d  becam e 
an  o b jec t so disgusting th a t no  o n e  w ould  com e n e a r  h im . D isgust is a 
powerful an d  treacherous em otion. Sensitive to danger, it becom es itself a 
dangerous affective state, causing us to re jec t an d  d eg rad e  objects th a t we 
find disgusting.
T hough  for the sake o f simplicity I have tried  to focus my discussion on 
disgust as a response to art, som etim es I have slid in to  co nsidera tion  o f  this 
em otion  as it is experienced  in real circum stances. Som e such slippage is 
inevitable; aesthetic em otions have m oral salience b o th  in an d  o u t o f  art. 
As we have seen, the  bo rd er betw een im itation  an d  reality, a rt an d  life, is 
th in  and  perm eable at many sensitive points. Especially with an  em otion  such 
as disgust, the boundary can d rop  away altogether. Disgust inco rpora tes its 
ob jects so deep ly  in to  consciousness th a t  they  b eco m e  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  
visceral, bodily aversion, thereby d ram atiz ing  the po tency  with w hich such 
em otions attach  us to the world.
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